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Abstract 
This paper analyses costs and benefits of three different post-Kyoto policy options:  
On the one hand there is PARETO which is the nickname for the pareto-efficient in-
ternationalization of the external effects of global climate change through trading car-
bon emission rights on open global markets.  And there is QCAP as well as ICAP on 
the other.  Both are unilateral climate policies.  QCAP denotes a scenario where re-
gions aim for reducing domestic carbon emissions by a certain percentage annually.  
ICAP is a short cut for intensity targeting which is the US’ most preferred climate pol-
icy option.  In a world without uncertainty about future GDP and carbon dioxide emis-
sions it refers to the same abatement policy, however by means of technological pro-
gress only.  
 
Key Words: Climate policy, intensity targeting, R&D investments, Integrated Assess-
ment. 
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1 Introduction 
Global climate change defines a large-scale public good problem.  And since it will be 
necessary to proceed beyond no-regret policies, economists typically argue that 
there must be some international arrangement for abatement and burden sharing.  
The Kyoto Protocol reflects some of their wisdom, but – as is well documented - suf-
fers from several deficits (see Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999).  For example, Kyoto 
abatement strategies are not based on economic principles such as balancing costs 
and benefits of greenhouse gas reduction.  Nor does emission trade as allowed in 
the Kyoto Protocol stipulate efficiency.  Moreover, the lion’s share of costs have to be 
covered by the US, Japan and Europe.  It is no surprise therefore that some of the 
most important players have resisted ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  
Of course, taking the complexity of the issue as well as the conflicting national inter-
ests into account it is no surprise that the Kyoto Protocol can be considered only as a 
preliminary step towards a global climate policy.  Nonetheless, in our view, three fur-
ther aspects have to be considered.  First, rather than implementing an universal 
schema for carbon emission control, and rather than establishing emission trade on 
an open global market with a single price for carbon, Kyoto rules differ across regions 
and emission trading systems are fragmented:  Within jurisdictions like the European 
Union permit trade is active, but between jurisdictions, where the greatest gains from 
trade can be expected, markets are thin and encumbered by the friction of different 
rules. 
Second, global climate change is driven by burning fossil fuels, hence the penetration 
of carbon-free energy into the economy is important for the future climate.  For ex-
ample, Chakravorty et al. (1997) have shown that, if technology improvement in car-
bon-free energy were to follow historical rates, carbon emissions would peak before 
the middle of the century, even without climate agreements.  Now, independent of 
whether this is a too optimistic forecast or not, it makes us aware of the importance of 
technological innovations.  Consequently, global climate policy should send credit-
able signals for adopting low-carbon technologies, but the existing price signals are 
to weak.  For example, today sequestration of the CO2 effluent from coal plants is 
profitable only at prices over $100 per ton of CO2, which is roughly ten times as much 
as the price seen in the European Emission Trading System. 
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Third and finally, the Kyoto framework gives no credit for technology improvements - 
a fact that partly explains the impasse between the US and the EU.  While the Euro-
pean Union focuses on capping emissions, the United States officially has an-
nounced an alternative approach to the challenge of global climate change1:  Green-
house gas intensity targeting should allow economic growth and environmental pro-
tection to go hand in hand.  It focuses on reducing the growth of GHG emissions, 
while sustaining the economic growth needed to finance investment in new, clean 
technologies.  And it holds the promise of a new partnership with the developing 
world. 
The rational behind this policy seems quite obvious.  Since it is technically feasible to 
uncouple the development of carbon emissions from economic growth through tech-
nological change, one could vision an alternative way of providing greenhouse gas 
insurance - even without the need of international coordination and cooperation in 
greenhouse gas mitigation.  For example, this could be the case if at least one player 
were able to provide sufficient technological progress from which all can profit.  Could 
this be the beginning of a new way of coping with the global climate problem?  Or is it 
nothing else than a fallback into a regime of economically inefficient climate policies?  
Is there realistic hope that putting technological change into the driver’s seat will 
solve the problem of global warming?  Or is it nothing else than a cheap excuse for 
non-cooperation?  And finally, what are the effects of stipulating research and devel-
opment in carbon-free energy on the world economy? 
For analyzing these questions this paper considers three post-Kyoto options:  On the 
one hand there is PARETO, and there is QCAP and ICAP on the other.  PARETO is 
the nickname for the pareto-efficient internationalization of the external effects of 
global climate change through internationally tradable emission rights.  This might be 
not a realistic post-Kyoto scenario since it requires cooperation of all nations.  And it 
requires that there is an open international market on which emission rights can be 
traded without any restriction.  Here it serves the purpose of a reference scenario. 
Both QCAP and ICAP are unilateral climate policies.  In contrast to PARETO where 
all regions can profit from trading carbon emission rights globally (see Müller-
Fürstenberger and Stephan, 2002), QCAP and ICAP do not allow for greenhouse 
                                                 
1  See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html 
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gas abatement where costs are lowest.  Carbon dioxide emissions have to be re-
duced in the region of origin.  This decreases flexibility and will increase economic 
costs of climate policy.  
In principle, emissions can be limited by an absolute cap on quantities (QCAP), or by 
some maximum allowable intensity to some measure such as GDP (ICAP).  As this 
indicates, the major advantage of ICAPs over QCAPs is that they provide more flexi-
bility in case of uncertainty about the future development.  However, in a world where 
future emissions and the economic output are known with certainty, both types of 
regulations have identical effects on abatement (see Ellerman and Wing, 2003).  
Hence, the question arises:  What are the differences between QCAP and ICAP?  
Under QCAP, regions can use a series of measures to reduce carbon emissions.  
This includes technological progress, fuel substitution as well as structural change 
within the regional economy.  Typically it is argued that since resources are scare, 
investing in environmental capital through emission abatement will reduce investment 
in conventional capital, which in turn might slow down economic development. 
Obviously, these effects very much depend on the development of costs of abate-
ment.  ICAP aims for reducing carbon emission through investments in advanced 
energy and sequestration technologies only.  This reduces costs of abatement so 
that the same emission target could be reached without lowering investment in con-
ventional capital.  In other words, Intensity Targeting (ICAP) is viewed as a policy for 
circumventing the investment crowding out effects and the negative impact on eco-
nomic growth just mentioned.  And there should be a further positive side effect.  
Since the rest of the world might profit from technology spillovers, the overall costs of 
greenhouse gas abatement could be reduced.  However, is it realistic to suppose that 
a more rapid technological change in the energy sector comes at no cost in terms of 
less rapid technological change in other sectors, conventional investment and – as a 
consequence of that – less economic growth? 
Answering these questions requires at least two kinds of an innovation.  First, tech-
nological innovation as well as the spreading of technological knowledge across re-
gions has to be made endogenous.  Second, integrated assessment analyses that 
are based on intertemporal computable equilibrium models typically apply a so-called 
Negishi-approach for obtaining numerical solutions.  This means that the analysis is 
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restricted to cooperative behavior.  However, both QCAP and ICAP are unilateral, 
strategies. Therefore we have to develop solution methods that allows for non-
cooperative behavior. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a top-down inte-
grated assessment model of global climate change with endogenous technological 
change.  This model is sufficiently transparent as to allow the implications of alterna-
tive viewpoints in post-Kyoto climate change policies to be explored.  Numerical pa-
rameters are taken from MERGE (see Manne et al., 1995), RICE (see Nordhaus and 
Boyer, 2000) and MEDEA (see Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger, 1998).  This al-
lows to relate our results to the existing literature.  Section 3 presents the main re-
sults of our numerical exercise, and Section 4 covers some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Modeling 
The following analysis is based on a small-scale intertemporal general equilibrium 
model that integrates sub-models, which provide a reduced-form description of the 
economy, emissions, atmospheric carbon concentrations and damage assessment.  
And it includes a top-down, micro-founded modeling of endogenous technological 
change both in energy supply and energy demand. 
For simplicity, there are just two regions of the world.  North (N) consists of the 
OECD countries plus the former Soviet Union.  Roughly, this corresponds to the 
ANNEX I parties.  South (S) covers the rest of the world, and is used as an acronym 
for the developing part of the world.  Each region is represented as if there were an 
infinite-lived representative agent who maximizes the discounted utility value of con-
sumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.  Each region produces a ho-
mogenous output that can be used for consumption as well as to cover energy costs.  
And it can be invested both in the formation of physical capital stock and in a stock of 
energy related technological knowledge.  This means in particular that costs of en-
ergy supply as well as the productivity of energy depend on technological progress. 
There is no allowance for international trade in produced commodities.  Nevertheless, 
there are two channels through which regions interact.  One is global climate change, 
which is directly attributed to cumulative CO2 emissions and affects gross production of 
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different regions of the world in different ways.  The second channel is the diffusion of 
energy related technological knowledge from one region into the other.  This is consis-
tent with general beliefs (see Keller, 2004):  Knowledge is a public good, and techno-
logical progress is an externality from which all parties can profit. 
 
2.1 Technological change 
There is increasing awareness that climate change policy and technological change 
interact (for example, see Goulder and Schneider, 1999).  The reasons are obvious.  
On the one hand, climate change policy affects relative prices.  This stimulates firms 
to develop less carbon-intensive processes and products.  On the other hand, due to 
the long time span involved, technological change affects abatement costs, hence 
the choice of an optimal climate change policy. 
In general there are two polar views on how to make technological change endoge-
nous within a framework of integrated assessment.  One is to follow the lines sug-
gested by bottom up models, i.e., to suppose that technological progress is induced 
through learning by doing (see Gerlach et al, 2004).  A second approach is to allow 
for investment in knowledge, i.e., to view innovation as a function of expenditure in 
research and development (see Nordhaus, 2002).  Both approaches have their ad-
vantages.  For example, there is a transparent micro-consistent framework for as-
suming that technological change is endogenously driven by piling up a stock of 
technological knowledge through research and development (R&D).  However, as is 
argued sometimes (see Goulder and Mathai, 2000) this might lead to an underesti-
mation of innovative potentials compared to the learning by doing approach.  The 
latter in turn has the drawback of being based on structural as well as behavioral as-
sumptions that are made implicitly only and which are not consistent with micro-
economic reasoning. 
This paper takes up the idea that at any point of time there is a stock of basic, ap-
plied and engineering knowledge.  In the short-run this stock, hence technologies are 
fixed.  But over the long-run knowledge is quite malleable and new technologies can 
be implemented through research and development activities.  Note that our ap-
proach differs from existing ones in two respects:  First, there is costless spillover of 
technological knowledge from the North to the South.  Second, there is endogenous 
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technological progress both in energy supply and energy productivity.  That means, 
technological progress has three different effects:  (1) It affects the marginal cost of 
energy supply, (2) it affects the carbon intensity of energy, and (3), it affects the en-
ergy efficiency of regional gross production.   
2.1.1 Technological innovation and energy efficiency 
To allow both for price-induced and autonomous (non-price) technological change in 
energy efficiency as well as for macroeconomic feedbacks economies are modeled 
through nested constant elasticity production functions.  These functions determine 
how in each region r = N,S, aggregate economic output, )t(y r , depends upon the 
inputs of labor, )t(L r , capital, )t(K r , and energy, )t(er  
 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ρρρα−α



 +=
/1
rr
1
rrr )t(e)t(a)t(L)t(K)t(y rr . 
 
Technical parameters rα  and ρ r are exogenous and constant, while the productivity 
of energy, )t(ar , is subject to endogenous technological change. 
Before describing how investment into technological knowledge affects the energy 
efficiency of the regional macro production, let us note:  (1) Technological progress is 
purely energy augmented.  Typically this is called Harrod neutral.  (2) Energy is 
viewed as energy services derived from both fossil fuels and carbon-free sources.  In 
other words, energy inputs are lumped into a single aggregate.  Hence, changing this 
mixture will affect carbon emissions from energy consumption. 
Technological innovation does not fall from heaven, and technical knowledge will de-
teriorate over time without training and education.  Moreover, research and develop-
ment do not translate one-to-one into technological knowledge.  To capture these 
aspects, let )t(Zer  be the stock of technological knowledge that is attributed to energy 
efficiency in region r at period t and let )t(ce  be the R&D expenditure into that stock 
of knowledge.  Then the stock of energy consuming technologies changes over time 
according to  
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s
rδ  denotes the factor at which knowledge deteriorates, 
S
rϕ  is a production coefficient 
indicating the fraction of investment that is transformed into technological knowledge, 
and κ is an output elasticity parameter. 
To translate technological knowledge as represented by )t(Zer  into productivity gains, 
assume that R&D induced innovation is embodied in new capital goods only.  That 
means, the productivity of energy is determined by the fraction µr of new capital in the 
total stock as well as the stock of energy related knowledge.  The share of new capi-
tal goods in the total capital stock is given by  
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Given that, marginal productivity, )t(ar , of energy develops according to  
 
(4)  )t(Z)t(a)1t()t(a))1t(1()1t(a errrrrr γ+µ++µ−=+  
 
where γ  is a technical parameter. 
2.1.2 Technological innovation and energy supply 
Let )t(Zsr  be the stock of technological knowledge that is in region r attributed to en-
ergy supply in period t.  Similar to the notation of Section 2.1.1, let )t(cSr  denote the 
R&D expenditure into energy supply technologies, let srδ  be the factor at which 
knowledge deteriorates and let Srϕ  be the coefficient that indicates which fraction of 
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investment is transformed into technological knowledge.  Then the new stock of 
technological knowledge )1t(Zsr + , which is available in period t+1, is  
 
(5)  )1t(Zsr +  = )t(Z
s
r
s
rδ  + 
κϕ ))t(c( Sr
S
r .  
 
As was already mentioned above, energy is an aggregate of different fossil fuels and 
carbon free sources.  Therefore, investing into energy supply technologies has two 
effects.  On the one hand R&D affects the cost of energy supply, and it affects the 
carbon content of the energy inputs on the other.  To take up the first aspect, for 
each region r the marginal costs of energy supply, )t(mr , are linked to the stock of 
technical knowledge by 
 
(6)  )t(Zrrr
S
re)t(m̂)t(m)t(m ν−+= . 
 
)t(mr  and )t(m̂r  denote lower and upper bounds, respectively, and ν is a technical 
parameter.  Note, this functional specification mimics two key characteristics of R&D 
driven technological change.  First, as the so-called ‘fished out’ approach (see Jones, 
1995) suggests, because of a limited pool of ideas, there is a negative stock effect of 
already accumulated knowledge on the marginal productivity of R&D activities.  That 
means, the marginal cost of developing new ideas increases as the stock of current 
knowledge increases. Second, marginal costs decline with increasing knowledge, but 
there are lower bounds that cannot be undercut.   
The second aspect of technological innovation in energy supply, i.e., a change in the 
carbon content of the energy aggregate, is discussed in the following section. 
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2.2 Regional emissions and global climate change 
Energy consumption directly determines the flow of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere.  
That means, regional carbon emissions, )t(sr , are related to regional energy inputs 
er(t) through  
 
(7)  )t(e )t()t(s rrr η= , 
 
where )t(rη  is the regional emission coefficient. 
Recall that within our framework, there are three options for reducing regional carbon 
emissions.  One is input substitution, i.e., substitution of energy through capital 
and/or labor inputs in regional macro production (see equation (1)).  A second option 
is to increase energy efficiency of regional production through R&D (see equations 
(1) and (4)).  Finally, R&D in energy supply technologies does not only reduce mar-
ginal costs of energy supply (see equation (6)), but can also have the welcome effect 
of reducing emissions.  For example, in the case of a coal-fired power plant, increas-
ing the efficiency of the energy transformation process results in lower carbon emis-
sions per unit of energy.  This is the rationale behind coupling the emission coeffi-
cient rη (t) to the stock of technological knowledge 
 
(8)  )t(Zrrr
S
re)t(ˆ)t()t( ς−η+η=η , 
 
where lower and upper bounds on the emission coefficient are given by rη  and )t(ˆ rη , 
respectively, and ς  is a technical parameter. 
The flow of carbon emissions contributes to the atmospheric stock of carbon A(t), 
which evolves according to 
 
(9)  
=
φ+φ=+
S,Nr
r21 )t(s)t(A)1t(A . 
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The parameters 1φ  and 2φ , respectively, describe natural degradation of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide and immediate uptake of emissions in the ocean.  The model is 
calibrated such that with zero abatement, carbon concentrations will rise from 353 
ppm (the 1990 level) to 550 ppm (twice the pre-industrial level) by about 2070.  This 
leads to damages of 3.5% of gross output in the South and 1.5% of GDP in the 
North.  At other concentration levels, the regional damages are projected as though 
they were proportional to the square of the increase in concentrations over the 1990 
level. 
For simplicity, we neglect the thermal inertia lag between global concentrations and 
climate change.  We also neglect the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating ef-
fects of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.  Instead, potential global warm-
ing is directly attributed to increased atmospheric CO2 concentration and will be trans-
lated into its economic impact according to a quadratic damage function 
 
(10)  
2
r
r
)t(A
)t( 

	





Ω
∆=θ , where )).0(A)t(A,0max()t(A −=∆  
 
θr(t) measures the fraction of conventional wealth that is available to region r for dis-
posal as green GDP.  Or to phrase it differently, 1-θr(t) is the region-specific environ-
mental loss factor.  Ωr marks the critical value of the CO2 concentration at which re-
gional production is reduced to zero. 
Regional Green GDP θr(t)yr(t) can be used to cover energy expenditures, )t(cEr , it 
can be consumed c(t), might be invested into physical capital )t(ir , or spent on R&D 
)t(c)t(c)t(c er
s
r
D&R
r += .  Therefore,  
 
(11)  )t(c)t(c)t(i)t(c)t(y))t(1( D&Rr
E
rrrr +++=θ−  
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is the material balance of produced goods in region r, where costs of energy supply 
)t(cEr  are measured in terms of GDP and are determined through  
 
(12)  )t(e )t(m)t(c rr
E
r = . 
 
At any point of time - or to phrase it more precisely  - for any given state of technol-
ogy, the marginal costs )t(mr  are constant, but due to technological change, mar-
ginal costs of energy supply will vary over time (see equation (2)).  
 
2.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium  
Energy-related R&D activities are carried out in the North only.  But they create a 
public good whose benefits accrue to the South with a time lag of two years.  That 
means  
 
(14)  s,ej),t∆t(Z)t(Z jN
j
S =−= , 
 
where index j refers to the type of technology stock.  
At any point of time t, the regional endowment Kr(t) in physical capital depends upon 
investment activities, ir(t-1), and the former capital stock, Kr(t-1) 
 
(15)  )t(i)t(K)1t(K rrr
K
r ω+δ=+ , 
 
where Kδ is the capital survival rate and rω  a technical parameter. 
Let β be the social discount rate.  Then consumption, production, investment in physical 
capital and greenhouse gas abatement are determined in each region r = N,S, as if a 
policy maker has maximized the discounted sum of single-period utility (the logarithm) 
of consumption, cr(t) 
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(16)  Wr = Σt βt ln(cr(t)). 
 
Except for PARETO, regions do not cooperate in greenhouse gas abatement.  In-
stead they maximize their welfare independently.  Since there is no market-oriented 
trade, it is unnecessary to use a Negishi based solution procedure as in MERGE, 
RICE or MEDEA.  Therefore, the challenge for computing this non-cooperative equi-
librium is to match expected future carbon emissions with the aggregated emissions 
in both regions.  
 
3 Computational Experiments 
What are the economic as well as the climate effects of the three policy scenarios 
PARETO, ICAP and QCAP?  Answers to this question are based on numerical calcu-
lations, which are carried out by means of the GAMS/CONOPT3 software.1  Results 
are reported for the time span 2000 – 2100.  However, to avoid end-of-the horizon 
effects, calculations are carried out till 2170.  
 
3.1 Benchmark Data 
2000 is the base year for our numerical experiments.  Model parameters are either 
derived through benchmarking against base-year data (see Table 3.1) or are taken 
directly from the literature (see Table 3.2). 
                                                 
1 For a description of this software, see the GAMS homepage 
http://www.gams.com/solvers/solvers.htm#CONOPT 
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MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES NORTH SOUTH 
Labor income (trillion US$) 16.490 3.710 
Capital income (trillion US$) 7.070 1.590 
Energy expenditures (trillion US$) 1.240 0.900 
Energy related R&D expenditures (billion US$)  14.017  
R&D share energy consumption technology  (%) 17  
Carbon dioxide emissions (GtC)  3.200 3.400 
Climate damage at 560 ppmv in % of GDP 1.5 3.5 
Potential growth (%) 1.500 2.500 
 
Table 3.1: Benchmark data and parameters 
 
PARAMTERS NORTH SOUTH 
Capital survival rate                   [δK] 0.950 0.950 
Investment technology               [ωr] 0.200 0.200 
R & D output elasticity               [κ] 0.500  
Knowledge depreciation in %   [δrs,e] 5.000  
Max. marginal energy costs savings     [%] - 30 - 30 
Max. carbon intensity reductions of energy [%]  - 75 - 75 
Elasticity of substitution                [ρ]  -.500 -.500 
Utility discount factor                    [β] .975 .975 
Climate system parameter          [φ1] 0.99  
Climate system parameter           [φ2] 0.64  
 
Table 3.2: Model parameters as taken from the literature2 
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How to specify and calibrate production technologies, social welfare functions and 
the functional proxy of the climate system is almost common practice in Integrated 
Assessment Models (for example, see Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger, 2004).  
Introducing R&D driven technical change, however, requires considerable effort to 
reconcile modeling demand and data availability.   
As discussed in Section 2, there are two steps through which energy-related techni-
cal progress enters our model framework.  First, R&D expenditures are translated 
into stock-of-knowledge additions (see equations (2) and (5)).  The corresponding 
parameters are taken from Griliches (1979) as well as Goulder and Mathai (2000).  
They are displayed in Table 3.2.  Second, the technological knowledge is linked to 
production possibilities.  It is central to our calibration approach that all parameters of 
the corresponding equations (see (1) and (4)) are calibrated such that in the base 
year investing in new knowledge yields the same market returns as investing in 
physical capital.  There are no positive externalities encountered, i.e., external effects 
due to climate change impacts and technological spillovers are not accounted for in 
the calibration process.3  With respect to cost savings in energy supply, there is a 
lower limit relative to the current state of technology (see Goulder and Mathai, 2000).  
And there is a lower bound on the carbon intensity of energy with respect to the 
benchmark intensity (see Table 3.2).  
In our model, technological progress is completely R&D driven. Calibration requires 
data about energy related R&D expenditures.  According to IEA statistics, govern-
ments of OECD member countries spent 8.410 billions US $ on energy related R&D 
in 2000.  This accounts for roughly 60 % of total energy related R&D investments.4  
About 17 % of this budget was allocated to energy conservation technologies.  In our 
terminology, this is R&D expenditures on energy consumption.   
Unfortunately, data availability does not allow to discern between de-carbonizing 
technical change and efficiency improvements in energy supply.  This problem has 
                                                                                                                                                        
2   R & D output elasticity is taken from Goulder and Mathai (2000:20).  The knowledge depreciation 
factor value has been suggested by Griliches (1979). 
3   Calibration refers to the “real world” economy, which - given the current state of affairs – does not 
internalize positive externalities of R&D. 
4   Dooley (1999) reports for the United States that in 1996 around 44 % of energy related R&D ex-
penditures were spent by the private sector.  The private sectors in Japan, Germany and Italy ac-
count for 36, 30 and 71 %, respectively.  Given the shaky grounds on which these data are based, 
we take the mean value and fix share of the private sector at 40 % of total energy related R&D. 
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been sidestepped in the literature by coupling emission reduction to general technical 
progress (see Buonanno et al., 2001).  Here we slightly improve this approach by 
coupling de-carbonizing progress to improvements in the energy supply technology.  
We calibrated such that doubling energy supply related R&D efforts in the benchmark 
period (base year) reduces the emission intensity of GDP by 3 % in the base year.  
 
3.2 Simulation results 
Before presenting the outcome of our computational experiments, let us shortly recall 
the key characteristics of the policy scenarios under consideration.  ICAP assumes 
that the North pursues intensity targeting by R&D investments in energy-related 
technologies.  More precisely, based on technological progress the North aims to 
reduce the carbon dioxide to GDP ratio by 3 % per year.  The South is free of any 
climate policy restriction, but can profit from the North’s technology improvements 
through costless spillover.   
QCAP assumes that the North imposes constraints on carbon dioxide emissions 
such that the global atmospheric carbon concentration is similar to those under ICAP. 
In other words, from a climate change perspective ICAP and QCAP do not differ.  
Finally, PARETO refers to full international cooperation in combating with global cli-
mate change.  But what if there were no climate policy intervention at all?  This is 
described by a scenario called BASE, where both North and South develop inde-
pendently without any restriction on carbon dioxide emissions. 
Figure 3.1 reports for each scenario how atmospheric carbon will develop over time.  
Within the report period, none of the scenarios exhibits a turning point, neither in re-
gional emissions nor in accumulated atmospheric carbon.  However, the growth 
rates, and as a consequence of that the climate damages, differ significantly across 
scenarios.  As expected, BASE yields the highest stock of atmospheric carbon.  It 
implies a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
by 2060.  This is only slightly earlier than in PARETO.  The lowest carbon concentra-
tion is reported for QCAP and ICAP.  By definition, these yield equal carbon emission 
and concentration paths.  This indicates that both scenarios impose a tighter con-
straint than a pareto-efficient climate policy would prescribe.  
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Figure 3.1: Atmospheric carbon concentration. 
 
Now let us turn to the economic impacts.  Figure 3.2 shows how GDP will develop in 
the North.  Since the effects are small, Table 3.3 gives the per cent deviations from 
the BASE for 2030, 2050, 2070, and 2100. As can be expected for the long-run, 
PARETO is best in terms of green GDP, whereas QCAP performs worst.  This could 
be viewed as an argument to support the skeptical position of many US economists 
against the Kyoto Protocol.  However, two observations are astonishing.  First, there 
is almost no difference between BASE and PARETO till 2075.  Since PARETO as-
sumes full international cooperation in climate policy, whereas in BASE there is no 
climate policy at all, this implies that in terms of regional welfare cooperation does not 
really pay for the North within the next 75 years.  Second, ICAP is superior to QCAP.  
Obviously this result is driven by positive externalities of northern R&D expenditures, 
which outweigh efficiency losses of using one instrument only.  Note that QCAP also 
induces higher R&D expenditures than BASE.  But under QCAP, the economy can 
also substitute energy for capital, which helps to minimize instantaneous abatement 
costs. 
 18
  
 
Figure 3.2: Green GDP in North 
 
Figure 3.3 shows how the economy of the South is affected by the different policy 
options.  No climate policy at all (BASE) is the worst case for South.  This simply re-
sults from the fact that all other scenarios imply lower climate damages and higher 
technological spillovers. 
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Figure 3.3: Green GDP in South 
 
While this outcome is in line with economic intuition, ICAP and QCAP exhibit counter-
intuitive patterns.  There is almost no difference between these two non-cooperative 
policy scenarios.  How can this be explained?  Now, recall that the technology spill-
over from the North to the South gives rise to two first order effects:  First, given the 
same resource endowment the South can realize a higher GDP.  Second global 
emissions, hence climate damages decline, provided that a higher productivity of en-
ergy consumption and lower marginal costs of energy supply do not outweigh the de-
carbonzation effect of declining carbon intensities of energy input. 
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Year Region PARETO ICAP QCAP 
2030 N - 1.3 -1.43 -2.98 
 S -.39 .6 .86 
2050 N -1.0 -3.63 -2.67 
 S .3 2.41 2.69 
2070 N -.28 -1.61 -2.28 
 S 2.54 5.3 5.5 
2100 N 2.42 1.22 -1.35 
 S 2.59 8.8 10.63 
 
Table 3.3: Deviations in green GDP from BASE (measured in %t) 
 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 suffer from the fact that effects are very small which make it hard 
to discriminate among the scenarios.  Therefore, Table 3.3 again displays these re-
sults for four time points, but now measured in per cent deviation from BASE.  
Thereby the main massage is that both PARETO and ICAP pay back for North in the 
very long run only.  Welfare gains due to climate policy mainly materialize in the 
South. 
 
4 Conclusions  
Using a regionally disaggregated Integrated Assessment Model, we have discussed 
what generally is called the intensity targeting approach to climate change.  This type 
of climate policy was just recently advocated by the US-administration as an alterna-
tive to a Kyoto-style policy.  One has to be aware, however, that the main focus of 
this policy is not to reduce carbon emission per unit of GDP.  This is a welcome side 
effect.  Its main focus is the pivotal role of R&D driven technological progress. 
Our numerical analysis shows that intensity targeting by R&D investments can be 
superior to a unilateral quantity constraint on carbon dioxide imposed by the North 
only.  In particular from the South’s perspective, both intensity targeting as well as 
constraining emissions are beneficial policies with only negligible differences.  By 
stimulating technological change, the North can provide an incentive to abate more 
carbon emissions in the South than without such a policy.  As such, the technological 
externality that the North produces pays back in terms of weaker constraints on its 
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emissions.  
It must be mentioned that technology progress is extremely difficult to specify even in 
a small-scale Integrated Assessment Model.  In particular it requires heroic assump-
tions with respect to functions and parameter choices.  In this paper it is assumed 
that energy related technical progress is initiated by R&D efforts in OECD countries.  
After a short time lag, new technologies spread worldwide and present some type of 
public good.  This means that we have to consider two types of externalities within 
our model:  A negative externality due to carbon dioxide emissions on the one hand, 
and a positive externality due to technological spill-over on the other.  
Obviously, our results are driven a good deal by the assumption that there is costless 
diffusion of advanced technologies from the developed to the less developed parts of 
the world.  This is consistent with conventional beliefs, and what just recently has 
received empirical evidence.  However, as Keller (2004) summarizes, there is no in-
dication that diffusion occurs automatically.  This is part of the scenario experimental 
setting and subject to future research.   
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